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ABSTRACT In much of the literature on Hobbes, he is considered a 
proto-liberal, that is, he is seen as setting up the apparatus that leads 
to liberalism but his own authoritarian streak makes it impossible 
for liberals to completely claim him as one of their own (hence the 
qualifier of proto). In this paper, I argue that, far from being a precursor 
to liberalism, Hobbes offers a political theory that is implicitly anti-
liberal. I do not mean this in the conventional sense that Hobbes 
was too conservative for liberalism (as Schmitt would argue). On the 
contrary, I will argue that in his writing, Hobbes evinces a concept 
of collective interpretation, theories of individualism and the nature 
and possibilities for democratic politics, that is radical and offers 
a completely developed alternative to liberalism even as it eschews 
conservative and reactionary models as well. I focus in particular on 
the idea of individualism and how the model offered by liberals (in 
this case specifically Locke) and conservatives (in this case specifically 
Schmitt) offers far less in terms of individual choice and justice than 
Hobbes’s own theory does, however paradoxical this may seem. 
Key woRdS Hobbes; Locke; Schmitt; liberalism; individualism; 
sovereignty; universal.
ReSUMeN En gran parte de la literatura sobre Hobbes se lo considera un 
protoliberal, es decir, se lo ve como quien ha puesto en marcha el aparato 
que conduce al liberalismo, pero sus propios rasgos autoritarios hacen 
imposible para los liberales considerarlo completamente como uno de su los 
suyos (de ahí el calificador proto). En el presente artículo, argumento que, 
lejos de ser un precursor del liberalismo, Hobbes ofrece una teoría política 
implícitamente antiliberal. No me refiero al sentido convencional según 
el cual Hobbes sería demasiado conservador para los liberales (como diría 
Schmitt). Por el contrario, sostendré que en sus escritos, Hobbes demuestra 
un concepto de interpretación colectiva, junto con teorías de individualismo 
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y de la naturaleza y las posibilidades de una política democrática, que es 
radical y ofrece un desarrollo completamente alternativo al liberalismo 
rehuyendo, al mismo tiempo, de modelos conservadores y reaccionarios. Me 
centraré, en particular, en la idea del individualismo y cómo el modelo de 
los liberales (específicamente pondré por caso a Locke) y los conservadores 
(concretamente el caso de Schmitt) ofrecen mucho menos en términos 
de elección individual y justicia que la propia teoría de Hobbes, por muy 
paradójico que esto pueda parecer. 
PAlABRAS ClAve Hobbes; Locke; Schmitt; liberalismo; individualismo; 
soberanía; universal.
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One commonplace about Thomas Hobbes is that he is a proto-liberal, 
that is to say a thinker who is not himself a full bore liberal (for that was 
to come with Locke and others in Hobbes’s future) but who nevertheless 
can be read as anticipating and even framing liberalism by bestowing 
it with some of its most vital concepts. Although the word proto-liberal 
isn’t used all the time, there is a great deal of support for the view that 
Hobbes and liberalism have a strong and critical connection. 
For Lucien Jaume, for example (who uses the term directly):
Hobbes may be seen as a proto-liberal, due to the capacity to 
judge that he allows the individual, even within the latter’s bond 
of submission. By insisting that the sovereign, his subjects, the 
‘people’ and the conditions of civil society are all ‘artificial,’ 
or the work of artifice, Hobbes at the same time recognizes the 
durability and force of natural right that persists throughout. 
It is not the priority given to security that makes Hobbes a 
possible candidate liberalism but rather natural liberty, its 
complementary and veiled face. Natural liberty is the space 
granted to the human being as the natural person exceeding the 
role of the citizen; it is also the reservoir of natural rights that may 
surpass positive right and substitute for it. (2007, p. 210).
Many other thinkers ranging from Richard Tuck to Judd Owen support 
this view, arguing that much of Hobbes’ apparent disregard for 
toleration (a mainstay of liberalism) is a product of his own specific 
responses to the crisis of the English civil war (Tuck, 1990). For Owen 
(2005), toleration itself is an absolute for Hobbes and so falls within 
the purview of liberal thought. There are also some anti liberals who 
saddle Hobbes with a connection to liberalism (which in their view is 
a bad thing). Although he wrote many decades ago, C.B. MacPherson 
(2010) is still probably the best known of this group, arguing that 
Hobbes is an apologist for a nascent capitalist order.
There are some challenges to this view as well, of course. Within 
the ranks of liberalism itself, Gordon Schochet (1990), for one, is well 
known for arguing that Hobbes’s notion of obligation is incompatible 
with liberalism.
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Beyond the scope of liberalism itself, perhaps the most famous 
thinker to argue against Hobbes’s connection to liberalism is Carl 
Schmitt. For Schmitt, Hobbes exposes the fundamental flaw in 
liberalism. He states that Hobbes reveals liberalism’s reliance on 
assumptions about legalism and constitutionalism that disguise a 
harsher truth: that sovereignty is in fact above the law that liberalism 
would use to bind its within its embrace. The true sovereign is, in 
Schmitt’s famous rendering “he who decides on the exception” (2005, 
p. 5). In other words, it is the state of emergency that tells you the truth 
about who really commands, even in a liberal democracy. For Schmitt, 
it is Hobbes’s theory in general, and his notion of sovereignty portrayed 
in Leviathan in particular, that reveals the actual nature of politics. In 
his view, Hobbes is not only not a liberal but his work exposes the lies 
and vulnerabilities upon which liberalism is based. 
In this essay, I am going to challenge both the liberal reading of 
Hobbes as well as Schmitt’s by arguing that while Hobbes is indeed anti 
liberal, his illiberalism can be read as coming from a more left rather 
than right position (to the extent that those terms are helpful for a 
thinker that predates this division). My argument will be twofold. First, 
that Hobbes is far from being a proto-liberal but is rather someone who 
challenges liberalism deeply and secondly, that this challenge exposes 
something possibly unexpected about liberalism itself. To some 
extent, this is an argument that I have already made in previous writing 
but in this paper I’d like to focus on one particular aspect of Hobbes’ 
work that I see as being in strong contradiction to liberalism (and, 
once again, a contradiction that works against Schmitt’s conservative 
reading of him as well), namely the question of individualism (Martel, 
2007). I will agree with Jaumes that Hobbes supplies us with a theory 
of individualism but in my view it is a remarkably, even radically, 
different form of individualism than what you find with later liberal 
versions. Perhaps more provocatively, I will argue that what liberalism 
offers —which I will examine mainly through an analysis of the work 
of John Locke— is not really individualism at all, at least not the form 
of individualism that liberalism usually promises (that is what is 
unexpected). It is Hobbes and not Locke, I will claim, who give us a 
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clearer picture of what radical individualism looks like and it is neither 
autonomous nor connected to sovereign power and authority. 
In making these arguments, I will claim that Hobbes’ 
individualism is almost the exact opposite of the liberal version that 
is to come after him. While the liberal version is autarkic in the way 
she is connected to others but universal in the way that she thinks and 
reasons, for Hobbes it is the other way around. Hobbes’ individual is 
heterogeneous in terms of the sources of her thought and judgment 
but an individual when she tries to think and judge in this larger 
context. This difference is critical, as I will show further, because, even 
as liberalism insists that the individuals it depicts are entirely unto 
themselves, independent of one another in all ways (and, if they are 
not, this is a political problem for which liberalism offers itself as the 
solution), I will suggest that Hobbes’ own version of liberalism is much 
more radically decentralized. His model of subjectivity reveals by 
contrast how much the liberal model is constrained by the individual’s 
participation in the liberal universal, in occult forms of theology that 
persist long after Locke’s more candid regard for theological influences 
wears away (and which indeed persist to this very day). In this way, 
Hobbes confounds both the liberals who would like to claim him as 
one of their own as well as the Schmittian interpretation of him as 
advocating for a conservative or even dictatorial kind of politics. In my 
reading, both of these views are belied by the radical and decentralized 
form of individualism that Hobbes promotes.
The hobbesian Subject
Let me begin this discussion by an examination of the Hobbesian 
subject, beginning with her mode of consciousness, how she knows 
what she knows. As already noted, in terms of the way the Hobbesian 
subject encounters the world around her, thinks and responds within 
her environment, she is explicitly and entirely heterogeneous. For 
Hobbes, even the most basic aspects of human consciousness are not the 
individual’s own but rather come from her interaction with the outside 
world. As Hobbes famously states in the first chapter of Leviathan:
36
F
F
James R. Martel
The cause of sense is the Externall Body, or Object, which 
presseth the organ proper to each sense, either immediately, as 
in the Tast and Touch; or mediately, as in Seeing, Hearing, and 
Smelling: which pressure, by the mediation of Nerves and other 
strings and membranes of the body, continued inwards to the 
Brain and Heart, causeth there a resistance, or counter-pressure, 
or endeavour of the heart, to deliver itself: which endeavour, 
because Outward, seemeth to be some matter without. (Hobbes, 
1651/1991a, 1.4, p. 13). 
From this passage, we already begin to can see that the Hobbesian 
subject is the product of a Copernican shift during the Renaissance in 
thinking about human consciousness moving from a being who reaches 
outwards to discern the world to one who the world presses upon, 
producing sensations and serving as the origin of human thought. 
From this basis, Hobbes proceeds methodically through 
imagination, which he likens to an afterimage in the mind (like the 
rolling of waves in the ocean long after the wind ceases) and memory, 
which is imagination over a period of time and finally to particular 
thoughts which themselves cannot exist (nor can the train of thoughts 
connecting them) without some original object to inspire it (including 
an object that has decayed over time and thus produces images in our 
mind of things that don’t actually and literally exist). 
One piece of evidence that our mental processes rely entirely on 
externality comes in Hobbes’ discussion of dreams. He writes that:
Whereby the Imaginations there formerly made, appeare as if 
a man were waking; saving that the Organs of Sense being now 
benummed, so as there is no new object, which can master 
and obscure them with a more vigorous impression, a Dreame 
must needs be more cleare, in this silence of sense, than are our 
waking thoughts. (Hobbes, 1651/1991a, 2.5, p. 17).
Here, we see that while we sleep, there are no external objects that 
present themselves to us. This leaves us to our own devices and makes 
us subject to internal “distemper[s]” (Hobbes, 1651/1991a, 2.5, p. 17). 
And, while Hobbes tells us that dreams are “more cleare” than our 
waking thoughts, this clarity is not itself an indication of greater truth 
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or grounding in reality but its opposite. That is, left entirely to our own 
devises, our thoughts run luridly but erratically and are in themselves 
no basis for further thought nor are they well suited to the formation of 
reason. Hobbes goes on to say that:
And because waking I often observe the absurdity of Dreames, 
but never dream of the absurdities of my waking Thoughts, I am 
well satisfied that, being awake, I know I dreame not; though 
when I dreame, I think my selfe awake. (1651/1991a, 2.5, p. 17).
In this way, for Hobbes, the kind of thoughts created by internal 
processes (as opposed to external heterogeneous ones) lead to absurdity 
and falseness. Hobbes tells us that the ancients’ failure to completely 
distinguish between dreams and waking is the reason that they held to 
so many superstitions and a belief in witchcraft, ideas that persisted 
into his own time and which he was highly critical of.
Crucially for my argument, for Hobbes, the schools, that is, the 
professions of academics in his day, reinforce this superstition in their 
ignorance of the workings of sense and imagination:
For (not knowing what Imagination, or the senses are), what 
they receive, they teach: some saying, that Imaginations rise 
of themselves, and have no cause; Others that they rise most 
commonly from the Will; and that Good thoughts are blown 
(inspired) into a man by God; and Evill thoughts, by the Divell; 
or that Good thoughts are powred (infused) into a man by God, 
and Evill ones by the Divell. (1651/1991a, 2.9, p. 19).
Here, we see a clear rejection both of autarkic thinking (“the 
Imaginations rise of themselves, and have no cause”) and just as 
importantly of the thought, widely held by Puritans and, I will argue by 
extension, liberals themselves, that God “blows” or inspires thoughts 
into a person’s mind. This doctrine turns the Holy Spirit into a material 
thing, a source of knowledge for human beings that bypasses the senses 
themselves and is, for Hobbes, an absurd and dangerous doctrine (one 
that I will get back to shortly in some detail). 
In addition to relying upon actual objects in order to be able to 
conceive of something, for Hobbes, human thought requires a second 
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connection to external reality as well, namely personal experience 
in the world. He writes: “how much one man has more experience of 
things past than another; by so much also he is more Prudent, and 
his expectations the seldomer faile him” (1651/1991a, 3.7, p. 22). Yet, 
Hobbes also goes on to argue that even a great deal of experience is not 
in itself enough to make us perfect predictors of the future: 
The Present onely has a being in Nature; things Past have a being 
in the memory onely; but things to come have no being at all, 
the Future being but a fiction of the mind, applying the sequels 
of actions Past to the actions that are Present; which with most 
certainty is done by him that has most Experience, but not with 
certainty enough. (1651/1991a, 3.7, p.22). 
In this way, for Hobbes we remain completely dependent upon the 
exterior world in the end. We can never master it utterly, never know 
a thing truly but only conjecture and guess. He even says that “the 
best Prophet naturally is the best guesser,” suggesting that even 
divine revelation doesn’t give us full access to truth in the world 
(1651/1991a, 3.7, p.22).
Accordingly, Hobbes tells us: 
Whatsoever we imagine is Finite. Therefore there is no Idea, 
or conception of anything we call Infinite. No man can have in 
his mind an Image of infinite magnitude; nor conceive infinite 
swiftness, infinite time, or infinite force, or infinite power. 
When we say anything is infinite, we signifie onely that we are 
not able to conceive the ends, and bounds of the thing named, 
having no Conception of the thing, but of our own inability. 
(1651/1991a, 3.12, p. 23).
It is true that for Hobbes we can reason better or worse. He gives 
plenty of evidence that he thinks that some are better at this form of 
mental arithmetic than others. Throughout his work, and perhaps in 
particular in sections devoted to human thought such as the first part 
of Leviathan, we see a tension in Hobbes between the claims to be able 
to scientifically know things (presumably including his own knowledge 
and his own science) and the fact that each of us reasons and thinks 
differently and that these variations produce not only errors but an 
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array of approximations of truth that are the best that we are capable of. 
Given the complexity and heterogeneity of human thought, for Hobbes 
we must learn to take into consideration the particular nature of the 
speaker as much as what he or she says or does: 
For though the nature of that we conceive be the same; yet 
the diversity of our reception of it, in respect of different 
constitutions of body and prejudices of opinion, gives everything 
a tincture of our different passions. And therefore in reasoning, 
a man must take heed of words; which besides the signification 
of what we imagine of their nature, have a signification also of 
the nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker; such as are 
the names of Vertues and Vices: For one man calleth Wisdome, 
what another calleth feare; and one cruelty, what another justice; 
one prodigality what another magnanimity; and one gravity what 
another stupidity, &c. And therefore such names can never be 
true grounds of any ratiocination. (1651/1991a, 4.24, p. 31).
Thus, in this way, the Hobbesisan subject thinks not so much for 
herself but as herself in relation to other persons and other things. One 
could call this contextually based or heterogeneous forms of thought. It 
reflects the ways in which thought is always embedded in a relationship 
to the external world, how even his much vaunted “morall and civill 
science” is itself a kind of highly educated guesswork (Hobbes, 
1651/1991a, 18.20, p. 129).
Thinking, and reading, for ourselves
For all of this, given the externally oriented origins of our every thought, 
Hobbes urges his readers to think for themselves. The very instability 
of our thinking process requires that each of us come to that process 
separately and individually:
For the errours of Definitions multiply themselves, according as 
the reckoning proceeds; and lead men into absurdities, which at 
last they see, but cannot avoyd, without reckoning anew from the 
beginning; in which lies the foundation of their errours. From 
whence it happens, that they which trust to books, do as they 
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that cast up many little sums into a greater, without considering 
whether those little summs into a greater, without considering 
whether those little summes were rightly cast up or not; and at 
last finding the errour visible, and not mistrusting their first 
grounds, know not which way to cleere themselves; but spend 
time in fluttering over their bookes; as birds that entring by the 
chimney, and finding themselves enclosed in a chamber, flutter 
at the false light of a glasse window, for want of wit to consider 
which way they came in. (Hobbes, 1651/1991a, 4.13, p. 28).
Throughout his writings, Hobbes will always protect and insist 
upon the right for each citizen to think, reason and interpret for 
herself. Each of us, regardless of our faculties, has the ability to reason 
(although Hobbes has somewhat disparaging things to say about people 
who lack certain senses, assuming they have a more limited engagement 
with the objects of the world). For all of his claims that the sovereign 
is the final judge of all things, Hobbes decentralizes both the ability 
to interpret as well as the necessity to do so. This is something I have 
argued at length about in a previous writing, a concept that is inherent 
in Hobbes’ injunction to the reader in the Introduction to Leviathan to 
“Read thy self” (Hobbes, 1651/1991a, intro.3, p. 10 and Martel, 2007). 
While the sovereign form of interpretation may be seen as trumping 
all other readings (an argument I will revisit briefly later in this essay), 
Hobbes never compromises his understanding of interpretation as a 
widespread and individualized faculty. 
Hobbes reinforces this idea of decentralized forms of 
interpretation in a much later writing, Behemouth, which came out 
posthumously. That book, which is an account of the English civil war, 
comes in the form of a dialogue with a schoolmaster (A) speaking to a 
student (B). The student asks at one point about the wisdom of having 
Scripture readily available in English for a widespread audience. 
Did this have a deleterious effect, B asks A, on the war? Did it allow 
the promiscuous spread of various modes of interpretation which 
aggravated the war and led to the demise of the monarchy and the 
Church of England? B asks:
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If men be to learn their duty from the sentence which other 
men shall give concerning the meaning of the Scriptures, and 
not from their own interpretation, I understand not to what 
end they were translated into English, and every man not only 
permitted, but also exhorted to read them. For what could that 
produce, but diversity of opinion, and consequently (as man’s 
nature is) disputation, breach of charity, disobedience, and at 
last rebellion? (Hobbes, 1681/1990, p. 52 [228]).
Although A affirms the need and requirement to follow the sovereign 
in all matters, he goes on say that:
There are so many places of Scripture easy to be understood, 
that teach both true faith and good morality […] of which no 
seducer is able to dispossess the mind (of any ordinary readers), 
that the reading of them is so profitable as not to be forbidden 
without great damage to them and the commonwealth. (Hobbes, 
1681/1990, p. 53 [230]).
This passage suggests the necessity of allowing widespread reading 
whatever the risk that such readings might pose to centralized modes 
of authority. Although this may seem to be in keeping with a later 
liberal doctrine of tolerance and multiple interpretations, as I will 
go on to argue, I do not think that this is the case because the liberal 
subject, as I’ll show further, is not suspended in a social context that 
is the basis for her knowledge, nor is she required or asked to build 
up from the basics of sensory input the way the Hobbesian subject is 
asked to do. Most importantly of all, the liberal subject must do her 
own reasoning in the context of universal truths that are to some extent 
discernible to her in a way that they are not for Hobbes. Reflecting 
its own heritage from Puritan thought, liberal subjectivity reflects 
its embeddedness in a sense of a universal that brings with it many 
answers that are presupposed and predetermined reducing the variety 
of liberal interpretations to a quite narrow band. 
Unlike the liberals that followed after him (temporally speaking), 
Hobbes refuses to allow for a universal that is in any way available 
to human actors, leaving them, once again very much to their own 
devices. He tells us at one point in Leviathan that “there [is] nothing in 
42
F
F
James R. Martel
the world Universall but Names” (Hobbes, 1651/1991a, 4.6, p. 26). In 
other words, the only categories that can be considered to be universal 
are ones of our own invention (and hence not truly universal). Without 
a broader and more determinant universal, the Hobbesian subject is 
forced to make choices and guesses, as we have already seen. She can 
(and often does) choose to simply follow the edicts of someone else 
but, as Hobbes, shows, this generally leads to her disempowerment, to 
her subjection to would-be tyrants who use their own supposed access 
to truth as a way to dominate and control them (and all for the bad). 
This point has major political connotations. While formally 
Hobbes offers that the sovereign itself is something that must always be 
obeyed (just to keep us from killing one another) his own understanding 
of how human beings come to knowledge serves as a challenge to 
the untrammeled authority of sovereign authority. While liberalism 
requires a sovereign as a kind of spokesperson for the universal made 
manifest on earth (it is true that liberalism holds that any particular 
sovereign can be wrong and can be replaced but the absolute authority 
of the universal remains constant), Hobbes’ sovereign is as fallible as 
anyone else, perhaps more fallible because its formal connection to 
the external world is lessened by the sovereigns’ own exalted stature 
and lack of exposure to other sorts of people and things. In the absence 
of such ongoing and formative contact with the external world, the 
sovereign is more like a dreamer than a person who is awake. His or her 
thoughts may indeed be more vivid and more clear, but they are less of 
a response to the world around them and therefore more absurd, more 
inchoate, more internal and phantasmic.1 
To summarize then, the Hobbesian subject is heterogeneous. She 
exists in a world where the universal is not readily available to human 
beings. She must learn how to learn, thinking and reasoning according 
to her own faculties and her own access to the objects and experiences 
that form the world outside of her own person. While in his insistence 
on people thinking and reasoning for themselves, we already see a 
refutation of Schmitt’s reading of Hobbes as endorsing conservativism 
and even fascism, we can also begin to see more clearly how Hobbes’ 
1  Subverting the Leviathan makes a different version of this same point in much more detail 
(Martel, 2007).
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subject diverges from liberal forms of subjectivity as well. In order to 
contrast Hobbes and liberalism more clearly, let me first discuss the 
contrast between Hobbes and Puritans (who would be the progenitors 
of liberalism via Locke who came from their own ranks) in terms of 
the question of the Holy Spirit and individual forms of interpretation 
before moving on to a consider the liberal subject herself. 
The holy Spirit
I begin this discussion with reference to the Holy Spirit because 
this figure was a key basis of Puritan thought, with critical political 
implications about interpretation and thought both in Hobbes’ lifetime 
and ever since. Looking at the distinction between how Hobbes and the 
Puritans respectively thought about this figure is a helpful way to see 
how Hobbes’ own political theory and that of liberalism (and especially 
Lockean liberalism) take tremendously divergent paths.
Puritan and Quaker thought (which are related to each other 
but are not exactly the same thing) emphasize the way that the Holy 
Spirit is a force that inspires human beings in all of their diversity and 
plurality. Critically, for Puritans, the Holy Spirit was understood as an 
interpretive spirit, something that allowed them to understand (and in 
a collective way) the meaning of sacred texts. The Puritans were hardly 
uniform on this doctrine but rather formed a kind of continuum on the 
question of the Holy Spirit. They ranged from those mystics who thought 
that human reason could only get in the way of divine inspiration to 
those who thought reason and the inspiration of the Holy Spirit were in 
direct parallel (and closer to the doctrine of John Locke in that regard). 
At the more radical end of things you get considerations like this one 
from John Owen: 
There is no need of Traditions, […] no need of the Authority of 
any Churches […] A Church may beare up the light, it is not the 
light. It beares witnesse to it, but kindles not one divine beame to 
further its discovery. (Nuttall, 1947, pp. 43-44). 
Sentiments such are these are in direct contrast to the Catholic 
doctrine (and, depending on which source you are considering, 
Anglican thought as well) wherein subjects of the church were expected 
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to follow church teachings without question. For the Catholics especially 
(at least in one, more conservative and orthodox wing of the church) it 
was the church that did the interpreting for each subject; the subjects’ 
role was simply to accept and obey. 
Although, once again, Hobbes and the Puritans seem to share 
a propensity to insist on separate and individual interpretations 
of Scripture, Hobbes’ version strips away any and all supernatural 
elements (far more than even the most moderate Puritan), leaving his 
subject, once again, very much on her own. Unlike the Puritans, for 
Hobbes, the Holy Spirit is a purely and entirely metaphorical force. For 
Hobbes, the Holy Spirit is the Trinitarian figure that corresponds to our 
own time. He tells us that God “the Father” corresponds to Moses and 
the early “Kingdom of God” when God was the King of Ancient Israel. 
The notion of God “the Son” corresponds to Jesus Christ and the future 
Kingdom that he will lead. In between these moments we find our town 
time, bereft of divine leadership and requiring human beings to figure 
out things on their own. 
Given the tendency for human actors to turn to the Holy Spirit 
for answers in a time when God is largely (otherwise) silent, Hobbes 
seeks to make this figure unavailable for such rescues. Hobbes clearly 
strips the Holy Spirit as a figure of any real truth making abilities when 
he writes:
To say God spake or appeared as he is in his own nature, is to deny 
his Infiniteness, Invisibility, Incomprehensibility. To say he 
spake by Inspiration, or Infusion of the Holy Spirit, as the Holy 
Spirit signifieth the Deity, is to make Moses equall with Christ, in 
whom onely the Godhead […] dwelleth bodily. And lastly, to say 
he spake by the Holy Spirit, as it signifieth the graces, or gifts of 
the Holy Spirit, is to attribute nothing to him supernaturall. For 
God disposeth men to Piety, Justice, Mercy, Truth, Faith, and all 
manner for Vertue, both Morall, and Intellectuall, by doctrine, 
example, and by severall occasions naturall and ordinary. 
(1651/1991a, 36.13, p. 295).
Thus, as is perhaps appropriate for a time devoid of God’s direct (or 
even indirect) rule, the period of the Holy Spirit for Hobbes is one 
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marked by a radical aporia in terms of our connection to truth. Hobbes 
invariably treats the Holy Spirit as it is depicted in Scripture as a 
metaphor only so that when, for example, it says that certain people 
were filled with the Holy Spirit, that it means only a “Zeal to doe the 
work for which hee was sent by God the Father […]” (1651/1991a, 
34.14, p. 273). Here, the Holy Spirit offers no special power of its own, 
or if it does have any power (because Hobbes also connects this figure 
to the person of the church in our time) such a power is still limited and 
fallible, an entirely human affair. 
For Hobbes, the Holy Spirit represents an aporia in God’s 
universe, a space within which human beings can reason and think 
on their own (once again, the church may offer its own guidance but 
church ministers, like the rest of us, have to make best guesses about 
the correct decisions to make vis a vis Scripture).2
In a critical passage on this matter, Hobbes writes:
Whereas there be, that pretend Divine Inspiration, to be a 
supernaturall entering of the Holy Ghost into a man, and not 
an acquisition of Gods grace, by doctrine, and study; I think 
they are in a very dangerous Dilemma. For if they worship not 
the men whom they believe to be so inspired, they fall into 
Impiety; as not adoring Gods supernaturall Presence. And 
again, if they worship them, they commit Idolatry; for the 
Apostles would never permit themselves to be so worshipped. 
Therefore the safest way is to beleeve, that by the Descending 
of the Dove upon the Apostles; and by Christs Breathing on 
them, when hee gave them the Holy Ghost; and by the giving of 
the Imposition of Hands, are understood the signes which God 
hath been pleased to use, or ordain to bee used, of his promise 
to assist those persons in their study to Preach his Kingdome, 
2  This is one of the reasons why Hobbes may have chosen to argue that the political sovereign 
should also be in charge of Church liturgy. Since the clergy are not necessarily in any better 
position than the king to make judgments about Christian doctrine and practices, it made 
sense, he thought to locate such decisions in the hands of the sovereign, a figure who is more 
evidently and unproblematically arbitrary (as opposed to the clergy who, in claiming to speak 
for God, may and in his life time did enflame their parishoners with talk of supernatural 
powers and miraculous forces. 
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and in their Conversation, that it might not be Scandalous, but 
Edifying to others. (1651/1991a, 45.25, p. 451).
In this way, the doctrine of the Holy Spirit (a term Hobbes 
prefers to Holy Ghost insofar as the later is more conducive to be 
taken literally) is nothing but a sign of God’s grace, a metaphor that 
describes how each of us must engage in “doctrine and study” to know 
or at least guess at the meaning of the passages in question. Although 
“only” a metaphor, the Holy Spirit as a figure suggests that the power to 
interpret and to read (i.e. Read thy self) can never be, nor should ever 
be, taken away from the community as a whole. 
While, like all of Hobbes’ gestures towards the decentralization 
and wide distribution of thinking, reasoning and judging, there is 
an inherent risk in turning things over to human actors in all of their 
multitude, Hobbes once again protects such moves and even gives them 
the (empty) figure of the Holy Spirit as a way to preserve and keep that 
interpretive space. Here again, we can see that as opposed to the Puritan/
liberal universal, Hobbes gives us an anti-universal, a space that is 
undetermined by exterior, supernatural forces (including secularized 
versions of that supernatural force such as ideas about nature). 
From Puritanism to locke
Locke’s own connection to Puritan thought is well established.3 He 
came from a Puritan family and remained an admirer of Puritan 
thought. It is not however correct to say that Locke was a Puritan and 
leave it at that. For one thing, as already noted, Puritanism itself was an 
immensely diverse set of phenomena and Locke came from its more 
moderate wing. In addition, the political and social mood of England 
had changed dramatically from the heyday of the English Civil War to 
the time when Locke did most of his political and theological writing. 
In many ways, in serving as one of the key thinkers of and apologists for 
the Glorious Revolution, Locke continued to fight for Puritan causes 
but he did so in a way and mode that reflected the changes that had 
and would continue to radically change England’s political landscape. 
3  For more on Locke and his politics and Puritan influences see for example, Dunn, 1969 and 
Ashcraft, 1986.
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One of the key things that distinguishes Locke not only from many 
previous Puritan thinkers but also from Richard Hooker, who, although 
nominally an Anglican, was a major source of Locke’s political vision, 
is Locke’s belief that the age of miracles were long past. At first glance, 
this suggests a connection to Hobbes once again because the latter also 
rejected all forms of divine revelation in a contemporary context. Yet 
even here there is a contrast because, whereas for Hobbes a miracle 
is relative, depending on who observes it (reflecting his ongoing 
insistence on individual judgment and interpretation) Locke, on the 
other hand argues that God only makes miracles which are perceivable 
as being true by any reasonable person (Locke, 1695/1958, p. 97). In 
this way, we can already see how we are involved in a world where we 
have access, however limited and however secular the connection (in 
liberal iterations after Locke himself), to the universal. 
In his commentary on this point, Locke writes that: 
God, I believe, speaks differently from Men, because he speaks 
with more Truth, more Certainty: but when he vouchsafes to speak 
to Men, I don not think he speaks differently from them, in cross 
the Rules of language in use amongst them. (1689/1965, p. 173).
In this way, whereas Hobbes makes a firm separation between God and 
human forms of knowledge, Locke lessens that contrast by offering that 
all communications aimed towards human beings by God (what could 
be considered to be the provenance of the Holy Spirit) are available to 
reason. In this way, reason is not so much groping blindly in the dark 
(as it is for Hobbes) but is rather a parallel form of knowledge that 
is readily aligned to what God chooses to tell us. In this way too, the 
passing of the age of miracles is far less critical for Locke than it is for 
Hobbes because the world of secular reason itself corresponds quite 
closely to God’s created world. 
In terms of the ability to reason, Locke also distinguishes himself 
from Hobbes by making reason something which, if widely available 
to human actors, still manifests itself mainly in those with a superior 
class position. Thus, in the Reasonableness of Christianity, Locke writes: 
The greatest part of mankind want leisure or capacity for 
demonstration, nor can carry a train of proofs […]. Hearing 
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plain commands, is the sure and only course to bring them to 
obedience and practice. The greatest part cannot know, and 
therefore they must believe. And I ask, whether one coming 
form heaven in the power of God, in full and clear evidence 
and demonstration of miracles, giving plain and direct rules of 
morality and obedience, be not likelier to enlighten the bulk of 
mankind […] than by reasoning with them from general notions 
and principles of human reason? (1695/1958, p. 66).
While it is certainly true that for Hobbes as well as for Locke there 
are better and worse utilizers of reason, we have already seen Hobbes 
defend the reason of the non-elites exactly because he does not believe 
in a common pool of truths (the universal) that can be drawn upon. In 
this way, Hobbes evinces a lot more anxiety than Locke will that the 
learned too may make mistakes since theirs are only guesses and are 
colored by their own passions and contexts. In a way, the widespread 
dissemination of learning I referred to earlier serves for Hobbes as a 
kind of check on the dangers of bad decisions by elites (perhaps even 
the elite leadership of the sovereign itself), whereas for Locke there 
is no need for such a check. Reason is its own proof, its own form of 
sanctity (and its own form of safeguard against a tyrannical king). 
In writings like his Essay on Human Understanding and Of the 
Conduct of the Understanding, Locke reveals the degree to which reason is 
something far more collective and externalized than one would originally 
presume for one of the founders of modern liberal thought with its 
emphasis on individualism. Whereas for Hobbes, as already noted, truth 
(or at least our approximation of it) is a response to our encounter with 
objects, for Locke, such encounters are mainly a form of means testing 
of the higher conceptual categories to which these objects belong. Thus 
Locke writes in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding:
This whole mystery of genera and species, which make such a 
noise in the schools [notice Locke shares Hobbes’ antipathy for 
much of mainstream academia of his day] and are with justice 
so little regarded out of them, is nothing else but abstract ideas, 
more or less comprehensive, with names annexed to them. In all 
which this is constant and unvariable, That every more general 
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term stands for such an idea, and is but a part of any of those 
contained under it. (1689/1959, p. 19).
Given that for Locke reason involves the development of higher 
faculties than many of us possess, there is clearly (as there is not with 
Hobbes) an element of class, gender and racial domination in Locke 
that is critical for the good operations of reason. Thus, in the Conduct 
of the Understanding, Locke writes: “every man carries about him a 
touchstone [i.e. reason itself], if he will make use of it, to distinguish 
substantial gold from superficial glitterings, truth from appearances” 
(1706/1908, p.31). Locke goes on to write that: “The want of exercising 
[reason] in the full extent of things intelligible, is that which weakens 
and extinguishes this noble faculty in us” (1706/1908, p. 31).
Accordingly, Locke requires an elaborate social network to 
ensure that some members of society can reason on behalf of everyone 
else (something that is safe to do because Locke expects such persons 
to actually reason well and in accordance with nature and God’s will).4 
Locke also writes that: “[the obtaining of reason in those who don’t have 
the background or training for it] will not be done without industry and 
application […] and therefore, very seldom done” (1689/1959, p. 43).
Furthermore, since he tells us that “knowledge and science in 
general is the business only of those who are at ease and leisure”, we 
end up with a de facto hierarchy based on the calculations of reason 
itself (1689/1959, p. 46): 
The Americans [i.e. Native Americans] are not all born with worse 
understandings than the Europeans, though we see none of them 
have such reaches in the arts and sciences. And among the children 
of a poor countryman, the lucky chance of education, and getting 
into the world, gives one infinitely the superiority in parts over the 
rest, who continuing at home had continued also just of the same 
size with his brethren. (Locke, 1689/1959, p. 43).
Thus, for Locke (as for liberals more generally) it is not 
technically impossible for a poor or working class person to raise their 
station in life but it is highly unlikely to the point of being politically 
and socially meaningless. Because Locke subjects human actors to an 
4  I discuss this process in much greater detail in Martel, 2001.
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absolute yardstick where they can be judged to be higher and lower in 
terms of their reasoning abilities, there is little to no cause for him 
to protect or respect the interpretive authority of the lower classes. 
In more contemporary forms of liberalism, of course there has been 
a greater attention and lip service to a more widespread form of 
participation in collective forms of reasoning but insofar as the liberal 
universal remains, we are ranked from lowest to highest according to 
our conformity to or distance from its standards (as discerned and 
measured by the elites themselves). Perhaps the most important liberal 
innovation since Locke’s time is the increased possibility of changing 
social status (but this is already possible in Locke’s own theory which 
insisted both on the possibility of a person of low ranking rising above 
her status as well as the possibility of a person of high rank falling into 
dissolution, as relatively rare as both of these events might be). In this 
case, it may be less important to ask who is on top and who is on the 
bottom of the social and political hierarchy than the fact that someone is 
on top (what we now call the 1%) and someone else (most people, in fact) 
are on the bottom. The liberal universal, which formally makes us all 
equal and individuals, is precisely what reduces both that equality and 
that individuality to the point where other considerations (especially 
considerations of class, race and gender) are politically and socially 
far more important in terms of their effects on how lives are actually 
lived and experienced. This is why I have argued that for all its talk 
of individualism, liberalism, unlike Hobbesian thought, does not 
really give us individualism at all, or if it does, it is a peculiar sort of 
individualism, available only to elites and even then according to a very 
narrow range of options as determined by the liberal universal. 
hobbes and Schmittian individualism
Before moving onto a conclusion about liberal individualism and the 
ways that Hobbes diverges from it, let me briefly explore the way Carl 
Schmitt thinks about liberalism in order to attempt to dispel the idea 
that even if Hobbes’s theory of individualism isn’t liberal, it could 
still be aligned with a more reactionary form of politics. After all, the 
current right wing in the United States of America and elsewhere is 
fascinated by visions of radical individualism as promoted by authors 
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such as Friedrich Hayek and Ayn Rand. If Hobbes offers us an illiberal 
individualism, must it therefore be the same kind that right wing 
thinkers are calling for (and perhaps Schmitt’s version in particular)?
I seek to dispel this idea by noting that the radical individualism 
that we see in Schmitt is almost always set against the masses. His 
arguments against anarchism come down to the fact that even the 
anarchist must “decide against the decision” (1985, p. 66). In other 
words, anarchists cannot avoid the basic fact that politics itself is based 
on an existential distinction between friends and enemies and that, 
therefore, the decision as to where to draw the boundaries of politics 
cannot be avoided. Even to “decide against the decision” turns out not 
to really be a decision at all insofar as it means to become “in theory 
the theologian of the antitheological and in practice the dictator of the 
antidictatorship” (Schmitt, 1985, p.66). Decision is for Schmitt not a 
solitary act but one that involves everyone (and in a deadly serious way) 
and for this reason, it must be singular, leading to Schmitt’s famous 
line that “sovereign is he who decides on the exception” (1985, p. 5). 
The kinds of collective and ongoing decisions that Hobbes calls for and 
protects stand in great contrast to the solitary and elite level decision 
that for Schmitt is the heart of politics. 
Paradoxically, Schmitt bases at least some of his own reading on 
the work of Hobbes himself. For Schmitt, Hobbes exposes the lie of 
political theology that the secular world, as opposed to the theological 
order that it replaces, relies upon. Whereas the theological polity 
of earlier Christendom held the miracle to be a site of permanent 
possible exception, Schmitt tells us that the later secular order formally 
“reject[s] the exception in every form” (1985, p. 37). Hobbes is the 
thinker, for Schmitt, who reveals how this turn against the exception 
disguises the way that the exception is all the more embedded in the 
modern secular states’ most central tenets, disguised by the supposed 
break that has been made from religion. 
Yet, Schmitt’s evaluation of Hobbes’ break from religion is not 
always laudatory. He tells us that in the parallel he produces between 
the Immortal God and the Mortal God of the Leviathan, Hobbes has 
produced a “confusion” (Schmitt, 1985, p. 48) insufficiently separating 
the two kinds of Gods in ways that dispel some of the clarity Hobbes 
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otherwise provides. I would argue that this is no small point but actually 
indicates the way that Hobbes and Schmitt are quite far apart in terms 
of their respective thinking about individualism and its relationship 
to the social. In De Cive, Hobbes describes how during the “Kingdom 
of God,” when God was king of Ancient Israel, prophecies episodically 
erupted into the political and social order. As Hobbes depicts them, 
and in keeping with the way he values varied and collective forms of 
interpretations, these messianic interruptions were a good thing 
insofar as they allowed the people to decide for themselves if any given 
prophet spoke for God or not, thus giving them a chance to challenge 
what otherwise amounted to the theocratic rule of the Levite priests. 
He writes that:
Others did judge of the prophets, whether they were to be held 
for true or not. For to what end did God give signs and tokens 
to all the people, whereby the true prophets might be discerned 
from the false; namely the, the event of predictions, and the 
conformity with the religion established by Moses; if they might 
not use those marks? (Hobbes, 1642/1991b, 16.16, p. 325).
Even when the era of human kings begins (and the Kingdom of God 
thus ends), inaugurated by King Saul, Hobbes does not condemn the 
way these eruptions violated kingly sovereignty. Hobbes states that: 
“the civil power therefore, and the power of discerning God’s word 
from the words of men, and of interpreting God’s word even in the 
days of the kings, was wholly belonging to [prophets, among others]” 
(1642/1991b, 16.16, p. 326).
Insofar as the power of prophecy continued to rely on the people’s 
judgment (there was an ongoing stream of prophets deemed to be false 
as well as true), in effect this means that the people’s power to judge is 
not eliminated by its coexistence with sovereignty. Of course, Hobbes 
saw himself as living in an age (presumably our age as well) when 
prophecy was silent (much more silent than it is for Locke for whom the 
created world remains discernible by human reason) so this particular 
challenge to sovereign authority is no longer germane. And yet we see, 
by analogy at least, that any popular and collective set of decisions can 
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survive its coexistence with human sovereignty and perhaps even rise 
to the level of challenging that source of authority.
Thus, when Schmitt considers Hobbes’ excessive mingling (or 
at least insufficient separation) of the mortal and the immortal Gods, 
he may be referencing, at least obliquely, the way that Hobbes would 
not take this alternative and collective form of interpretive power, nor 
the challenge it poses to the one true individual in Schmitt’s system 
(the dictator), away. What appears at first to be a minor theological 
discrepancy may in fact reveal a way that Hobbes is insufficiently 
interested in one individual at the expense (or in the command of) 
everyone else. Thus, just as he differs from liberal individualism in his 
insistence that each person reasons separately and in conjunction, so 
too against the Schmittian model, Hobbes insists on individual thought 
adhering to each and every individual. As a collective these individuals 
serve, not to constitute the largely passive categories of political 
friends or enemies that Schmitt’s super individual seeks to rule and/or 
fight, but rather constitute a collectivity that retains the right to make 
its own decisions —so that we can speak of decisions and not just the 
decision for Hobbes— and have those decisions come directly out of its 
communal and collective (but still very much individual) patterns of 
thought and reasoning. 
Conclusion
Having shown the contrast between Hobbes and Locke, as well as 
between Hobbes and Schmitt, I want to now reiterate my arguments 
about why we should not consider Hobbes to be either a proto-liberal, (as 
countless liberals argue), nor a conservative foe of decentralized politics 
(as Schmitt argues). As I noted much earlier in this essay, one of the key 
contrasts between Hobbes and liberalism lies in the respective forms 
of identity and reason that Hobbes and Locke respectively subscribe to. 
Whereas the Hobbesian subject is heterogeneous in terms of the way 
her experience and thoughts are shaped via the collective processes that 
lead to her judgments and decisions, she is also separate —an individual 
thinker— as regards her own interpretation and judgment of her context. 
For Locke —and by extension for liberalism more generally— by contrast, 
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the subject is deemed autonomous in the way that she thinks (although, 
as I have argued, that autonomy is gravely compromised by the mass 
infusion of commonality from singular external figures such as the Holy 
Spirit and its later iterations), even as in her actual and personal thought 
processes, she is left utterly alone, cut off at the knees by recourse to a 
universal that is always and already true, and against which her own 
thoughts will be judged and ranked. This, I would say, is not really 
individualism at all but rather is a kind of collective process in which 
each person is set in her place (up or down the hierarchical ladder) and 
then told that she is radically on her own and solely responsible for her 
own fate and actions, even when such responsibility is already rendered 
impossible. In this way, I see the Schmittian version and the liberal 
version as being much closer to one another than either is to Hobbes own 
theory in that both systems instill mass passivity on the part of the vast 
majority of subjects, even as both systems claim to speak on behalf of the 
individual. In both cases, individualism is either a myth or a status that 
only adheres to a very few (in liberalism) or one (for Schmitt) even as it is 
deeply entangled with those below the social and political hierarchy that 
individual stands upon.
In this way, whereas Locke requires an elaborate social network 
to sustain the reason of a few elite individuals (who can then reason 
on behalf of everyone else), and Schmitt calls for a dictator to “decide 
upon the exception” (basically himself), Hobbes offers no such social 
model. It is true that Hobbes would submit us to a sovereign whose rule 
we must accept without question but as liberal thinkers are quick to 
point out, this requirement lies in tension with Hobbes’ individualism. 
I agree with that point but then go on to say that liberalism itself —
what follows from Locke onward— is, as already noted, not actually 
individualism at all but a system that manufactures macro individuals 
who contain a supportive cast of women, servants, children and slaves 
and who exist in relation to some set or body of universal truths that 
these subjects must work out and apply in their own communities. 
It is Hobbes’ careful exposition of the basis for reason and 
judgment, something that each of us can partake in for better or for 
worse, that offers a basis for radical individualism even as Hobbes’ 
considerations of how we know and think seems to demand a web of 
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social interactivity that connects us together and in ways that do not 
necessarily mandate hierarchies and other forms of domination. 
Hobbes is celebrated for stating that any human relationship based 
on domination, whether that of parenthood, slavery, gender or other 
relationships of this sort are not natural at all but purely political and 
therefore entirely subject to change. Locke and liberals to this day 
frequently turn to nature as a way to cover over the social hierarchies 
that he (and they) require to sustain his/their own vision of reason. 
And Schmitt’s friend/enemy distinction reinforces the question of 
who is in and who is out as well (including enemies that might exist 
within a polity and not just outside of its borders). 
It is true that Hobbes is famous for coming up with an entire 
set of natural laws but I would argue that by his own precepts, there 
is nothing natural about his understanding of natural law. By putting 
the human experience and interpretation of the external world at 
the center of his thought, Hobbes has put nature into question. 
Rather than relying on nature as Locke does as an absolute basis for 
knowledge (an extension of God’s will that human’s can understand 
divine principles), Hobbes complicates and possibly even subverts 
nature by making such truths inaccessible, just as he complicates and 
subverts the idea of sovereign political authority. Whereas a Lockean 
system requires a sovereign, even if they can be replaced from time 
to time should they fail to evince the reason that is the true guardian 
of the community, the Hobbesian system sets sovereign rule at odds 
with the widespread forms of interpretation that Hobbes insists upon 
at any costs. And whereas Schmitt grants the sovereign the absolute 
authority that he sees Hobbes granting this figure as well, we see in his 
complaint that Hobbes confuses the sovereign with God, an indication 
that Hobbes’ sovereign is never as absolute and never as unchallenged 
as Schmitt portrays him to be. 
This is not to say that Hobbes is perfect while liberalism is utterly 
false (I’d only be comfortable with the second half of that sentence) or 
that he has no streak of the authoritarian in him as Schmitt suggests. It 
may well be that if Hobbes were reincarnated on the spot and read this 
paper, he’d express some (maybe even a great deal of) chagrin at being 
associated with radical leftism (although you never know with Hobbes; 
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his own frequent and loud claims of political and theological orthodoxy 
were not widely subscribed to in his lifetime and he was called 
everything from an atheist to an anarchist by his contemporaries). Yet 
the nature of his individualism, the way we think and reason and judge, 
has consequences that are not readily squared either with the right wing 
Hobbes that Schmitt espies or the proto-liberalism that contemporary 
liberals ascribe to him. Whether as a consequence of a logical clash 
between his theory of thought and judgment on the one hand and his 
formal stated political vision on the other, or the result of a deliberate 
attempt to disguise radical thought in the pose of orthodoxy, Hobbes 
offers us a vision of the human actor that shows us what individualism 
might really look like, in contrast to the liberal vision which promises 
much but delivers less than nothing and the Schmittian version which 
doesn’t even bother with such promises. 
For these reasons, when it comes to questions of individualism, I 
would align Hobbes, however improbably it may seem, not with Locke 
or Schmitt, but with thinkers from the far left like Walter Benjamin 
(1996) and Jacques Derrida (1992), as well as with Friedrich Nietzsche 
(1995)(who perhaps cannot be perfectly claimed by any political 
position due to the complexity and vastness of his thought). Perhaps 
this can be seen most clearly in considering a statement that Benjamin 
makes in the “Critique of Violence” where he says that when faced with 
an argument even as clear as the Biblical Commandment “Thou Shalt 
not Kill” we do not give up on the requirement of interpretation. As 
Benjamin puts it: 
Neither divine judgment nor the grounds for this judgment can 
be known in advance. Those who base a condemnation of all 
violent killing of one person by another on the commandment are 
therefore mistaken. It exists not as a criterion of judgment, but as 
a guideline for the actions of persons or communities who have 
to wrestle with it in solitude and, in exceptional cases, to take on 
themselves the responsibility of ignoring it. (1986, p. 250).
Here, we see something very similar to what Hobbes himself has to 
offer, a form of individualism that has no clear and absolute guidance 
from any source (not from the universal, not even necessarily from 
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God). As such, commandments and laws serve not as absolute 
anchors that determine our own response but just as Benjamin writes 
“guideline[s]” that we must struggle with individually and collectively. 
Like Hobbes, Benjamin leaves us effectively to our own devices even 
as he recognizes that even if we are reasoning alone, we always do so 
in a context of mutual implications, entanglements and overlaps of 
judgment and authority. This kind of individualism, which I would 
equate to radical anarchism, is not eclipsed by sovereign authority 
but rather exists alongside it, sometimes retreating and sometimes 
advancing in its face but never disappearing entirely. 
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